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INTRODUCTION
Over 76 years ago, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
called for the adoption of strict liability for products liability cases and for the
rejection of negligence in such cases. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recently agreed in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc.1 Strict liability leads to corporate
*
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104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014).
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liability and this results in increased payments to victims and slightly lower
profits. Corporations responded to strict liability with a firm embrace of the
negligence cause of action, which puts both parties on an equal footing. This
results in corporations winning more cases. The PLAC (an association of corporations that file amici briefs defending corporations) argued for negligence
in Tincher.
In this Article, I argue in favor of strict liability and support the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Tincher.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided critical clarification of
strict products liability in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court modified strict products liability in Pennsylvania, it is
important to understand the development of this type of cause of action.
Products liability has long-existed in the United States. In 1942 in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., the Supreme Court of California held that
because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements
of res ipsa locquitor, an inference of negligence could be drawn.2 The Supreme
Court of California also reiterated that when a defendant presents evidence to
rebut an inference of negligence under res ipsa locquitor, a question of fact
whether the reference has been dispelled arises.3 However, the importance of
Escola is Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion where he argues that manufacturers should be held to the standard of strict liability.”4 In his concurrence,
Justice Traynor explained that negligence was not working in products liability
cases because such cases were costly, circular, and often led to bad results.5
“[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be found wherever it will most
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health interest in defective products
that reach the market.”6
In the years following Escola, the Supreme Court of California again
heard various products liability cases and further developed its jurisprudence.
In 1963, the Supreme Court of California was presented with another products
liability case.7 Writing for the majority, Justice Traynor was able to turn his
concurrence in Escola into law. The Supreme Court of California in Greenman
2

150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).
Id.
4
FRANK J. VANDALL, A HISTORY OF CIVIL LITIGATION 27 (2011).
5
Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
6
Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
7
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963).
3
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concluded that the manufacturer of a produce is strictly liable “when an article
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.”8
Years later in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., the Supreme Court of
California outlined two tests.9 In Barker, the defendant company’s high-lift forklift lacked outriggers, which made the forklift more susceptible to turning over.10
Indeed, the defendant company’s high-lift forklift fell over because of the absence of outriggers and ultimately injured Barker, the operator of the equipment.11
Barker, injured by the defendant company’s high-lift forklift sued the company,
alleging that the forklift accident was caused by one or more defects in the
forklift loader.12 Hearing the appeal, the Barker majority adopted a strict liability
standard, holding that strict liability applied to defective products.13
In 1965, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted a Greenman-like
statement of strict products liability in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.14
Specifically, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
8

Id. at 900.
573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). The Supreme Court of California “reiterate[d that] a product may
be found defective in design, so as to subject a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting
injuries under either of two alternative tests.” Id. at 455. “First, a product may be found
defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.”
Id. at 455-56. “Second, a product may alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Id. at 456.
10
Id. at 447.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 446.
14
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
9
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(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.15
Justice Traynor persuasively laid out the reasons for shifting from the
negligence standard to the strict liability standard.16 As provided in his concurring opinion in Escola, Justice Traynor wrote:
I believe the manufacturer’s negligence should no longer be
singled out as the basis of a plaintiff’s right to recover in cases
like the present one. In my opinion it should now be recognized
that a manufacturer incurs [strict liability] when an article that
he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human beings. . . . Even if there is no negligence, however,
public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident
that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who
suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing
of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such
products nevertheless find their way into the market, it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they
may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its
reaching the market.
It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If
public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason
not to fix that responsibility openly . . . .
15
16

Id.
Escola, 150 P.2d 436.
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. . . As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with
its great markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has been
altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets are
ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general
public. The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to
investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it
is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance
has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up
confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trademarks . . . .
Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them
on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trade
mark . . . .17
Writing for the majority in Greenman, Justice Traynor took the opportunity to “make clear that the liability [of manufacturers of defective products]
is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict
liability in tort.”18 These policies established in California regarding strict
products liability form the foundation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
decision in Tincher.
II. AZZARELLO19 AND TINCHER
A. Azzarello: Pennsylvania Strict Products Liability Before 2014
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Azzarello in 1978. In Azzarello, the plaintiff suffered an injury to his hand following an incident involving
a coating machine.20 As a result of having his right hand crushed in the rollers
of a coating machine, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the machine in strict
liability and the manufacturer joined the employer as a co-defendant.21 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the language from § 402A “unreasonable dangerous” had no place in a strict liability charge to the jury.22 This
decision tracked the California case of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson, Corp., which
17

Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Greenman, supra note 7, at 901.
19
Azzarello v. Black Bros, Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).
20
Id. at 1022.
21
Id.
22
Id.
18
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involved a defective bread rack in a delivery truck.23 In Cronin, the Supreme
Court of California approved a charge on “defect” and rejected giving a charge
containing the phrase “reasonably dangerous.”24 It reasoned that those words
sounded of negligence and were inappropriate in a strict liability charge.25
Likewise, the Azzarello Court said “unreasonably dangerous” wrongly
“signaled to the jury that the consumer has the burden to prove . . . negligence.”26 The Court concluded “in strict liability cases, burdening a plaintiff
with proof of negligence is unwarranted; the sellers liability is sufficiently limited” by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture or
design of the product . . . .”27
Azzarello divided the tasks for the court and jury in a strict liability case
and can be summarized as follows: the court shall determine the applicability
of the phrases “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous” which are
indicators of “whether recovery would be justified.”28 Such determinations are
issues of law and policy “entrusted solely . . . to the trial court.”29 In contrast,
“the inquiry into whether a plaintiff has proven the factual allegations . . . is a
question for the jury.”30
In a stroke of the pen, the Azzarello Court went too far thirty-nine years
ago when it, without necessity, added “the seller is a ‘guarantor’ of the product.”31 The addition of this term is misleading and not needed to implement
strict liability in products cases. What followed in Pennsylvania was thirty-five
years of high wind and rough waters. The first fifty-nine pages of the Tincher
decision outline the nature of these numerous legal problems. Azzarello would
have been clearer and less troublesome for Pennsylvania if it had merely said
that the manufacturer of a defective product would be held liable.
B. Tincher and Its Holding
Tincher is a simple products liability case. The manufacturer of flexible stainless steel pipe designed to carry natural gas into a house-marketed pipe
that was very thin (“the thickness of four sheets of paper”).32 Lightning struck
23

501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
Id.
25
Id.
26
John Lavelle, Jr., 7 Takeaways from Pa. High Court’s Tort Revamp, Law 360 (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://www.law360.com/articles/607722/7-takeaways-from-pa-high-court-s-tort-revamp.
27
Tincher, 104 A.3d at 367 (discussing the Court’s reasoning and analysis in Azzarello).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 337.
24
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the pipe at the Tinchers.33 The house burned and was severely damaged.34 The
issue raised was should the pipe manufacturer, Omega Flex, bear the loss
caused by the thin pipe.35 The thin pipe was alleged to be defective because it
did not meet the gold standard of thick cast iron pipe.36
Following almost forty years of debate about the meaning of strict
products liability, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided to use Tincher to
clarify the law by putting negligence theory in products cases to rest.37 First it
reversed the lower court that had followed Azzarello.38 Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the holding in the California case of Barker39 ,
which provides a two-part test for defect. Tincher states that proving either test
will suffice: “[w]e hold that, in Pennsylvania, the cause of action in strict
products liability requires proof in the alternative, either of the ordinary
consumers expectations test or the risk-utility test.40
Earlier in the Tincher opinion the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined
these two tests. Under the consumer expectation test, “the product is in a defective condition, if the danger is unknowable and unacceptable to the average or
ordinary consumer.”41 Quoting comment (i) to the Restatement, the Court said
“The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”42 A court may
consider several factors: “the nature of the product, the identity of the user, the
products intended use and intended user, and any express or implied representtations by the manufacturer or seller . . . .”43
Attention was also given in Tincher to defining the risk-utility test.
“The test offers a standard which . . . states that: a product is in a defective
condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and
seriousness of harm caused by the product outweighed the burden of the costs
of taking precautions.”44 The important distinction between strict liability and
negligence is manifest in the charge to the jury. In negligence the jury is asked
33

Tincher, 104 A.3d at 335-36.
Id.
35
Id. at 335.
36
Id. at 335-36.
37
Id. at 335.
38
Tincher, 104 A.3d at 335.
39
Id. at 368.
40
Id. at 401.
41
Id. at 335.
42
Id. at 387.
43
Tincher, 104 A.3d at 387.
44
Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
34
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whether the design team was negligent, did they exercise care. In contrast, in
strict liability the jury only looks at the product and weighs whether the product
was defective, the care of the design team is irrelevant.45 This is often made
clear by saying that “care” by the manufacturer is not admitted before a jury in
a strict liability products case.46 In strict liability, the court is often criticizing
the product design program of a large corporation by calling the design
defective. Thus the outrage on the part of corporations because they believe
they are the experts.47
Strict liability beat out negligence in the products arena for the reasons
stated earlier by Justice Traynor and because it is cheaper and more efficient.48
Under §402A of the Restatement (Second), all sellers of the defective product
are strictly liable: the retailer, wholesaler, distributor, importer and the manufacturer.49 But, under the old discredited negligence cause of action, separate,
costly and time consuming suits must be brought against each entity in the
chain of distribution from retailer to manufacturer.50 The goal of this long expensive negligence process was to exhaust the funds and resolve of the victim.
It usually worked. Because victims often lost suits that they should have won,
the A.L.I adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in 1963.51
The Supreme Court deserves academic support for seeing through the
political haze and clearly rejecting the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2b. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts is a corporate white paper advocating maxinegligence and rests on a foundation of misrepresentation. It says the view of
the majority of courts in 1993 is that a “reasonable alternative design” must be
shown.52 John Vargo unearthed this fabrication in his 400 page article that
reviewed every decided products case, “reasonable alternative design” was
only followed by a few cases and was far from being the holding of the majority
45

Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
Id. at 362-63. Seventy-three years ago, Justice Traynor argued: “[I]t is to the public interest
to place the responsibility for injury upon the manufacturer even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, [he] is responsible for it reaching the market.” Escola, 150 P.2d
at 438-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
47
See LEE PATRICK STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE: FORD’S PINTO TRIAL 27 (1980).
48
See VANDALL, supra note 4, at 23-4 (quoting Professor Mitch Polinsky).
49
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
50
In Judge Traynor’s concurring decision in Escola, he made clear the victim under
negligence must sue the immediate seller. Escola, 150 P.2d at 442-44 (Traynor, J.,
concurring). If the immediate seller (dealer) loses, the dealer must sue the distributor. If the
seller is bankrupt, the victim recovers nothing. Id. at 442. In strict liability, anyone in the
product chain can be sued: manufacturer, distributor, importer, or immediate seller. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 402A.
51
VANDALL, supra note 4, at 30.
52
Id. at 89.
46
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of cases.53 Further, the approach set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts
is not one of simple negligence; rather, it is one of maxi-negligence because
it demands that a “reasonable alternative design” be shown by the victim in
all products cases.54 It is designed to hobble the plaintiff, eliminate strict liability, and force her to show more than mere negligence.55 As noted by the
Court in Tincher, all states, with the exception of Iowa, rejected the Restatement (Third) Products Liability § 2(a).56 With this background, the Tincher
Court reversed the Superior Court and awarded a new trial.57
III. “REBOOTING PENNSYLVANIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW”
“Rebooting Pennsylvania Products Liability Law”58 should be titled
“A Retro Look at Pennsylvania Products Liability Law” because it begs to
return to laws of pre–1963 in order to assist the injuring corporations as in
the old days. “Reboot” is simply a rehash of old law. The author, James Beck
strives to reintroduce negligence in order to help injurers, on the basis of the
law of 1963. At that time, negligence offered a neutral balancing of interests
in the courtroom. This meant the defendant corporation usually won because
it had the experts, the knowledge, the foresight, the staying power and the
money.59 In 1963, underfunded plaintiffs were routinely knocked-out by
well-funded defendants. This unacceptable result demanded that the American
Law Institute adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in 1964. The
foundation of § 402A is that the manufacturer of a defective product is liable
to an injured consumer or user.60 It is not a neutral balancing of interests
between parties when a product is defective as is found in negligence.

53

Id. at 98-9. See also Tincher, 104 A.3d at 353, n. 6; 355, n. 7; 386.
VANDALL, supra note 4, at 89.
55
See id. at 90 (Section 2(b) does not advance progress because (1) “it neither relies on nor
furthers traditional products liability policies”; (2) “it does not accurately reflect the practice
of courts today” and (3) “it does not benefit consumers.” Rather, Section 2(b) “solely benefits
sellers.”).
56
Tincher, 104 A.3d at 349 (citing Frank J. Vandall and Joshua F. Vandall, A Call for an
Accurate Restatement (Third) of Torts: Design Defect, 33 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 909 (2003)).
57
Id. at 335.
58
James M. Beck, Esq., “Rebooting Pennsylvania Products Liability Law: Tincher v. Omega
Flex and the End of Azzarello Super Strict Liability, 26 WIDENER L. J. 91 (2017)
59
Townsley & Hanks, The Trial Courts Responsibility to Make Cigarette Disease Litigation
Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL. W.L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1988).
60
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
54
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE TEN OLD SHIBBOLETHS
PRESENTED IN “REBOOTING”
1. James Beck argues the decision in Tincher is a “revolutionary” expansion of product liability [law].61 Not so. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A (1965) is a foundation of products law. In fact, Justice
Traynor in Escola foreshadowed it twenty-two years earlier in 1942.62
He argued that negligence in product’s cases was a waste of time, money
and judicial resources and that strict liability was needed.63 Therefore,
strict liability is 75-years-old and hardly revolutionary.
2. Beck argues for a return to contributory negligence in defective products
cases.64 Contributory negligence has been rejected by numerous courts in
products cases because it reintroduces negligence and would lead to bad
results.65 Contributory negligence may be present, but it is more efficient
to put the loss on the seller, because he can take preventative measures.66
3. The author of “Rebooting” bemoans the fact that the “reasonable man”
concept is no longer present in a products jury charge.67 The “reasonable man,” concept was rejected in 1972 in Cronin.68 Cronin involved
a defective bread-tray latch. While stopping the truck, the trays flew
61

Beck, supra note 58, at 93.
Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (“In my
opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incur an absolute liability when an
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.”).
63
See VANDALL, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion advocates
a position whereby “recovery in products liability cases should rest upon absolute liability.”).
64
Beck, supra note 58, at 101.
65
Pennsylvania rejected contributory negligence in 1975. See McCown v. Int’l Harvester
Co., 342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975) (“Adoption of contributory negligence . . . would defeat our
acceptance of 402A.”). For example, an automobile driver may be speeding (driving at 75
miles per hour in a 70 miles per hour speed zone) when his car flips and the defective roof
collapses, breaking the driver’s neck. Yes, the driver was contributorily negligent in
speeding, but it makes more sense to hold car manufacturer strictly liable than to throw out
the case under contributory negligence. Roofs should not be defectively weak and many
people are negligent and travel over the speed limit. Here, strict liability will help make cars
safer, reduce healthcare costs, and save lives.
66
The Court in Azzarello stated that “it is now the consumer who must be protected . . . the
risk of loss must be placed upon the supplier of the defective product without regard to fault.”
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1023-24.
67
Beck, supra note 58, at 112.
68
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
62
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forward and hit the driver in the back and propelled him through the
windshield.69 Defendant argued that the jury must be charged on the
“reasonable man” concept, but the California Supreme Court rejected
that because it “sounded of negligence.”70
4. The financial reality today is that many cars, trucks and machines are
leased rather than sold. The lessor is treated as the “seller” under §
402A71, but Beck argues for financial unreality by suggesting that
lessors should not be treated as “sellers,” not be treated as part of the
chain of distribution.72 This, even though a large lessor can spread the
loss as well as a large seller. A huge portion of cars and trucks are
leased. The lessor will profit if he is not held liable. Today he is a
member of the distributive chain and must be liable as a seller.73
Ignoring financial reality is attractive to Beck because it leaves victims
without a monied defendant.
5. A key concept in products law is that the seller should be liable for a
defective product because the victim is often innocent.74 Pennsylvania
has held “it is now the consumer who must be protected. Courts have .
. . adopted the position that the risk of loss must be placed upon the
supplier of the defective product . . . .”75 This is because the victim
lacks knowledge of the defect and can do nothing to prevent it. For
example, people who were burned to death in the crashes of Pinto
automobiles could do nothing to prevent them, but Ford knew of the
risk the gas tank would explode in a rear-end crash and has since
changed the design of their tanks.76 Beck argues that, as in yore, the
loss should rest on the innocent victim who could do nothing to prevent
the rear-end crashes that were a cause in fact of the Pinto fires.77
69

Id. at 1155-56.
Id.
71
See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965) (as an example of the
dramatic growth of strict liability in products liability law).
72
Beck, supra note 58, at 104.
73
Strict liability applies to a lessor of trucks because “(1) [t]he risk of harm to the lessee . . .
and members of the public is great; (2) the representations of the lessor that the vehicle is fit
. . . ; [and] (3) the reliance of the lessee. [T]he inducement offered to the consumer through
advertising and solicitation encourages reliance.” Cintrone, 212 A.2d at 781.
74
See Escola, 150 P.2d 436.
75
Beck, supra note 58, at 105.
76
VANDALL, supra note 4, at 22, n. 51 (citing LEE PATRICK STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE:
FORD’S PINTO TRIAL 27 (1980)).
77
See Beck, supra note 58, at 105-07.
70
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6. When a product has a defect and causes damage, sometimes “bystanders” are injured. Beck rejects recovery by “bystanders”, however.78 In
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., the defective drive shaft of a reardrive car dropped down and pole-vaulted the car into the on-coming
lane.79 The issue was whether the automobile seller should be liable to
the victim. The court held the seller should be liable, because he
manufactured the automobile, knew of the defect and could prevent it
in the future.80
7. One thing corporations do well is to evaluate and take financial risks.
This may result in huge profits, but may also result in bankruptcy and
this often leaves no one for the victim to sue.81 The product issue becomes whether the victim should be able to sue the successor corporation,
the one that follows the bankruptcy or sale of the corporation. Logic and
the law argue that he should be able to sue the successor corporation.
Beck cries foul.82 The simple answer to this problem is for the new
corporation to do due-diligence and research before the purchase of the
corporations, to find-out if any products suits are pending or likely to be
filed. They should reduce the size of the offer by the amount of the
outstanding risk. Again “Reboot” ignores financial reality.
8. Try this next exercise. Read your tire’s sidewall and report the manufacturers preferred inflation level. This is usually obscure and hard to
decipher even though getting the tire pressure wrong can cause death
from an exploding tire. “Reboot” prefers corporate inaction, even at the
risk of death. “The winning claim in Dambacher83 was modest – that a
warning should have been embossed on the tire.”84 Beck fails to explain
why embossing a warning on a tire’s sidewall is costly and difficult.
The fallacy in his argument is reflected in the fact that sidewall
warnings are commonly available today.
78

Id. at 107.
451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969).
80
Id.
81
Beck, supra note 58, at 108.
82
Id. at 108.
83
Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408 (1984) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 500 A.2d 428
(1985), overruled sub silentio on other grounds, Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000,
1008 (2003) (as to negligence claim).
84
Beck, supra note 58, at 109.
79
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9. Clearly judges have a different task than juries. However, Beck argues:
“Although courts engage in multi-factorial analysis to evaluate ‘unreasonable dangerous defect initially, juries were not allowed to consider
these same factors under the Azzarello ‘any element’ standard.”85 A
few more sentences to clarify his point would have helped. He probably meant that the jury should be charged to weigh these factors. But,
such a charge would sound in negligence.
10. The reason industry standards are unreliable and not controlling in strict
liability cases is because they were written by the defendant corporations or their associations in order to maximize profits and often not
to promote safety.86 Beck calls for industry standards to nevertheless
control in products case.87 Tincher rejected that argument: [The] Pennsylvania Supreme Court [ ] held ‘industry standards’ go to the negligence
concept of reasonable care, and . . . under our decision in Azzarello such
a concept has no place in an action based on strict liability in tort.”88
In summary, “Reboot” has failed to persuade because the author ignores
products liability history, legal progress and economic reality. He claims
“Tincher represents a sea-change in the products liability field.”89 But that
is demonstrably wrong. Products theory emerged 75 years ago in Escola and
was codified by the A.L.I. 53-years-ago in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A. Further, Tincher rests on the history of perhaps 5,000 decided
products cases.90
He is further mistaken in concluding “negligence concepts of reasonableness and foreseeability have returned to the strict liability battlefield.”91
Tincher holds just the opposite. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the
approach established by the California Supreme Court and stated that “we
85

Id. at 111 (citations omitted).
See VANDALL, supra note 4, at 74-5 (citation omitted) (“The effectiveness of manufacturers in influencing administrative agencies to adopt certain safety standards is wellknown. Manufacturers thus may prefer to have agencies rather than courts set standards.”).
87
Beck, supra note 58, at 114-15.
88
Id. at 113.
89
Id. at 182.
90
In 1992, Professor James Henderson said there were 3,000 cases. I am assuming there are
perhaps 2,000 more now. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512,
n.1.
91
Beck, supra note 58, at 182.
86

104

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Aug. 2018

follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and Barker.92 The injured
person is free to choose either the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility
test.93 This is the Pennsylvania system of strict products liability largely disconnected from negligence.
V. HOUSE KEEPING POINTS
A. Tasks of the Judge and Jury in a Strict Liability Products Case
The task of the court is to determine whether sufficient evidence of
defect has been presented by the victim to send the case to the jury. The Tincher
Court stated: “[C]ounsel must articulate the . . . strict liability claim by alleging
sufficient facts to make a prima facie case premised upon either a ‘consumer
expectations’ or ‘risk-utility’ theory, or both.”94
However, the jury may not be left to guess: “[T]he jury may not be left
free to find a violation of . . . consumer expectations whenever it chooses.
Unless the facts . . . permit an inference that the product . . . did not meet the
minimum safety expectations of . . . ordinary users, the jury must follow the
second test and engage in the balancing of risks and benefits . . . .”95 The judge
is still the gatekeeper. If the victim fails to show sufficient evidence under the
consumer expectation test, then “the jury must be instructed solely on the . . .
risk-benefit theory of design announced in Barker.”96 To be sure the jury is
left to decide the factual questions in the case such as the thickness of the
Omega-flex pipe, if that is contested.
B. Should the Burden of Proving a Safe Product Be Shifted to the Seller?
The second prong of Barker held: “once the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design,
the burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the
relevant factors, that the product is not defective.”97 In Tincher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is troubled by this uncommon burden shift.98 The Court,
however, refused to decide the burden shift question because it had not been
briefed. It said, “shifting the burden of proof onto a defendant places the risks
92
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of an erroneous decision upon the defendant. . . . Pennsylvania does not
presume a product to be defective . . . proving a negative is generally not
desirable . . . because of fairness concerns.”99 Although the above discussion
is dicta, the Court here foreshadows that it may reject the Barker burden shift.
VII. TINCHER CAPTURES OUTSIDE INTEREST
As I write to evaluate Tincher, professional critics have also commented
on it. The Products Liability Advisory Council (PLAC) argued for negligence.100
Winning a suit is a matter of percentages. The negligence action favors manufacturers and strict liability favors victims. The PLAC represents their corporate
members by arguing for the negligence cause of action through amici briefs in
product cases.
The task of PLAC is not to do research. Instead they are professional
Amici.101 Their goal is to get two bites at the apple for defendant corporations.
They are a club for corporations and they produce briefs that take the injurers
view. Of course this view has already been thoroughly presented by the
defendant corporation so PLAC hopes to persuade the court by adding weight:
two groups (injurer and PLAC) make the same argument. The Tincher Court
perceptively saw through this charade and concluded: “The amici offer
essentially the same legal and policy arguments as those parties in support of
whom their briefs were filed.”102
CONCLUSION
Tincher did much to clarify Pennsylvania products liability law and
thus assist the victim to recover. It adopted a two-part test for design defect that
originated in 1963. It rejected the defense of contributory negligence and the
maxi-negligence concept of the Restatement 3rd, therefore, a victim need not
99
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show a “reasonable alternative design.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
in Tincher that the court must first determine that there are grounds for holding
that the product is defective before sending the question of defect to the jury.
Importantly, Pennsylvania’s highest court rejected the PLAC’s argument for
negligence and held fast to strict liability and protecting the victim.
Well done, Pennsylvania!

